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firms’ export product scope; whereas in response to the foreign country’s tariff cut, a
home firm’s export product scope expands (shrinks) if the firm’s management cost is
low (high), independent of the firm’s production cost. These predictions are confirmed
by our empirical analysis based data of Chinese firms from 2000 to 2006.
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1 Introduction
Multiproduct firms contribute to a large percent of production and international trade
worldwide. They frequently adjust their product scope in response to changes in economic
environment and policies (Bernard et al., 2009). Product scope adjustments affect firm
and industry average productivity (Bernard et al., 2010 and 2011). The recent research
has increased our understanding about firms’ adjustment in respose to trade liberalization
(see the most recent review in Qiu and Zhou, 2013). However, our knowledge of this
issue is still very limited. This paper goes one step further to examine how firms adjust
their export product scope (not the total product scope) in response to one-sided trade
liberalization, namely, domestic tariff cut or foreign tariff cut, respectively.
As sythenized by Qiu and Zhou (2013), the collective wisdom from the literature at the
present stage is that in response to globalization, which is represented by bilateral trade
liberalization, high productivity firms may expand their product scope while low produc-
tivity firms definitely reduce their porduct scope. A firm’s optimal product scope is jointly
determined by marginal cost of adding new product lines, which is strictly increasing, and
the marginal benefit of adding new product lines, which is (weakly) decreasing under the
core competency assumption. Bilateral trade liberalization imposes two conflicting forces
on a firm’s marginal product: domestic trade liberalization exerts a negative impact (the
competition effect) but foreign country’s trade liberalization gives a positive opportunity
(the market expansion effect). If a firm is very productive, its marginal product is also
quite productive, and thus, the positive effect dominates and the firm expands its product
scope. In contrast, if a firm is not very productive, the negative effect dominates and
so the firm reduces its product scope. Unlike the existing studies which always look at
the outcome of the joint effects [NOTE: double check each paper], the present paper
analyzes each effect separately, which can be captured by one-sided trade liberalization,
either domestic or foreign. Although in the real world, multilateral trade liberalization
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exists through multilateral trade negotiations under the framework of the GATT and bi-
lateral trade liberalization exists especially under free trade agreements, one-sided trade
liberalization or asymmetric bilateral trade liberalization often occur. For example, since
1979 when China started to open its economy, China has unilaterally reduced its tariffs
from the average above 40 percent to around 9 percent. This evidence indicates that the
picture would not be complete if we do not examine how firms adjust their product scope
in response to one-sided trade liberalization. Another departure from the literature is that
we focus on the product scope actually traded, that is, a firm’s export product scope (the
number of products exported), rather than a firm’s total product scope (the number of
products produced).
As the existing studies seem to suggest that the qualitative effects of each one-sided
trade liberalization on all firms, high and low productivity, are the same, we choose a
homogenouse-firm model in order to sharpen our focus on the role of managerial efficiency.
[NOTE: we will revise the introduction from here] This paper examines how unilateral
trade liberalization affects Chinese firms’ export product scope. Unilateral trade liberal-
ization allows us to see the forces leading to the scope adjustment much more clearly. In
particular, we analyze the effect of Chinese tariff cuts on Chinese firms’ export product
scope adjustment and that of foreign countries’ tariff cuts on Chinese firms’ export product
scope. In our theoretical model with only two countries, China and Foreign, the Chinese
firms are identical, but each has heterogeneous products with decreasing productivity.
Each firm’s decision is on its optimal product scope (total number of products to produce)
and optimal export product scope (total number of products to export). The domestic
tariff cut lowest the profit of every product of a Chinese firm, which induces the firm to
drop its unprofitable marginal products, hence reducing a firm’s product scope. If the cut
is drastic, more products will be dropped and even some of the products for export will also
be dropped, resulting in reduction in a firm’s export product scope. Hence, domestic tariff
cut affects export market. On the other hand, the foreign country’s tariff cut raises the
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profit of each export product of a Chinese firm. The direct effect should induce a Chinese
firm to expand its export product scope as some previously unprofitable products become
profitable in the export market. However, the tariff cut also induces a price drop of every
exported product, which makes the market competition tougher. This competition effect
tends to lower every product’s profit. Hence, whether the marginal export products will
see an increase in profitability or drop in profitability depends on the relative magnitudes
of the direct (positive) effect from tariff cut and the indirect (negative) effect from intense
market competition. We find that the direct effect dominates when the firm’s core compe-
tency is very efficient whereas the indirect effect dominates in the opposite case. That is,
in response to the foreign country’s tariff cut, a Chinese firm expands its export product
scope if the firm’s core competency is very efficient but reduces its export product scope
if its core competency is not very efficient.
We test our theoretical predictions on Chinese exporters. As there are hundreds of
tariff lines and Chinese firms export to more than a hundred foreign markets, to better
capture the trade liberalization impacts, we construct the firm specific home tariffs, i.e.,
the weighted average of those Chinese tariffs relevant to a firm’s product lines, and the
firm specific foreign tariffs, i.e., the weighted average of those tariffs from countries on
products that are relevant to a firm’s export products and markets. Our regression results
show that in response to Chinese tariff cuts, Chinese firms reduce their export product
scope; and in response to foreign tariff cuts, Chinese firms also reduce their export product
scope.
Theoretical studies in the literature of multiproduct firms generally predict that in
response to bilateral trade liberalization, all firms (low productive and high productive)
reduce their product scope (Arkolakis and Muendler, 2010; Baldwin and Gu, 2009; Bernard
et al., 2011; Dhingra, 2011; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Feenstra and Ma, 2008; Mayer et al.,
2011). The basic intuition is that every firm’s marginal products are very inefficient, and
like inefficient single-product firms being driven out of the industry after trade liberaliza-
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tion (Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008)), those marginal products will be dropped,
resulting in a reduction in product scope. However, Qiu and Zhou (2013) pointed out that
the result may be different if firms face increasing cost of introducing more product lines.
A firm continues to introduce more products until the marginal cost of introducing prod-
uct is equal to the market profit of the additional product. If the marginal cost of product
introduction increases very fast, a very productive firm’s marginal product must also be
very efficient. As efficient products benefit from trade liberalization, the most productive
firms will expand their product scope in response to trade liberalization. In contrast, the
present paper focuses on unilateral trade liberalization. It shows that it is possible that
both domestic tariff cut and foreign tariff cut, which seem to have opposite forces, have
the same effects on the exporters’ product scope adjustment: reducing export product
scope.
Most empirical studies of multiproduct firms have found significant impacts of trade
liberalization on firms’ scope choices. Despite the fact that most theoretical studies focus
on bilateral trade liberalization, many empirical studies are about unilateral trade liber-
alization. Dhingra (2011) showed that in Thailand during 2003-2006, less export-oriented
domestic firms increased their product lines in response to a unilateral tariff cut while
more export-oriented domestic firms reduced their product lines. Iacovone and Javorcik
(2010) documented that a substantial number of Mexican firms developed new products
for export as a response to improved access to foreign markets. Bernard et al. (2011)
demonstrated that U.S. firms exposed to more tariff reductions under the Canada—U.S.
Free Trade Agreement reduced the number of products they produce relative to firms ex-
posed to fewer tariff reductions.1 Goldberg et al. (2010) shown that during the 1989-2003
period when profound trade and other reforms took place in India, Indian firms added
1There are also empirical studies on bilateral or multilateral trade liberalization. Baldwin and Gu
(2009) found that tariff cuts between 1973 to 1997 induced scope contraction by small or non-exporting
Canadian firms, but had no effect on large or exporting firms. Berthou and Fontagne (2011) found that
after the eurozone was established in 1999 the most productive French firms increased their export product
scope in the eurozone destinations while less-productive French firms reduce their export product scope.
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more product lines than they dropped, and the dropping was unrelated to tariff reduction.
Clearly, the previous empirical findings have been far from complete or conclusive. The
empirical finding of this study contributes to the understanding of this phenomenon.2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the theoretical
model. In Section 3, we conduct an equilibrium analysis and derive results related to the
effects of trade liberalization on firms’ export product scope. In Section 4, we use Chinese
data to test the main theoretical predictions. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Model
2.1 Technologies
Consider a world with two countries, China and Foreign (the rest of the world). Let us first
describe the economy in China. There are two industries, one being the numeraire good
industry and the other being the differentiated products industry. Differentiated products
are produced by n symmetric (identical) firms and the numeraire good is produced by
atomic firms.3 If a firm produces just one product (its core competency), its marginal cost
is c.
A firm in the differentiated goods industry can produce multiple varieties or products.
Suppose that a firm decides to introduce a set of products with measure s. We index the
firm’s core competency as product 0 and others in descending efficiency in [0, s], which also
captures the situation in which products further away from the core competency become
less efficient. Let the unit cost of producing the ith product be ci = c + θi, θ > 0. The
unit cost of producing the core competency is c. Introducing a product is costly. If a firm
2Manova and Zhang (2012) also used Chinese data to explore multiproduct firms’ behavior. An im-
portant feature of their study is the linkage between multiple products and multiple quality. Echel et al.
(2011) also shared the same feature based on Mexican firms.
3We consider identical firms for simplicity as our focus is not on the difference between different firms.
Our empirical part shows that the behaviors between high-productivity firms and low-productivity firms
are not qualitatively different.
We focus on free entry at the product level and so we assume fixed number of firms, i.e., do not consider
free entry at the firm level. We will discuss the implications of relaxing this assumption later.
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introduces s products, there is a fixed cost equal to ks, where k > 0.
There is a cost of managing production and sales in both the domestic market and
overseas market. Assume that a unit management cost is m. So, if a firm sells q units of
a product to a market, it needs to spend mq on management.
As our focus is on the Chinese firms, let us simplify the situation of the foreign firms.
In particular, assume that there are n∗ identical foreign firms; all have the same marginal
cost of production, which is assumed to be zero; each firm produces a single product; and
there is not cost of managing production and sales.4
2.2 Product Markets
Following Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), we assume that there are Z identical consumers
in China, each having a quasi-linear preference for the numeraire good and all varieties
from the differentiated goods industry
U = Q0 + α

i∈Ω
qidi− 1
2
β

i∈Ω
qidi
2
− 1
2
γ

i∈Ω
q2i di,
where α, β, γ > 0, Q0 is the consumption of the numeraire good, Ω is the set of all
varieties sold in the Chinese market, and qi is the consumption of variety i. We treat
i as a continuous variable for mathematical convenience. A consumer maximizes her
utility subject to a budget constraint. As a result, the market demand for variety i by
all Z consumers is pi = α − βZ

j∈Ω
qjdj − γZ qi. For a given γ, when β is larger, other
varieties’ outputs reduce the demand for variety i by a larger amount, meaning that the
substitution between varieties is stronger. Therefore, β measures substitutability between
varieties: larger β means stronger substitution.
The set of varieties, Ω, is large and thus, the seller of variety i regards itself as a small
monopolist of variety i, but whose decision has no direct effect on other products.5 Then,
4 In this paper, we use asterisk (∗) to indicate variables of the foreign country.
5Following most studies in the literature, we do not consider carniberlization, which is about strategic
competition among varieties of the same firm.
6
competition between products is totally captured by the vertical intercept of the demand
function. In particular, the demand function for variety i is
pi = A− bqi, where A = αγ + βP
βM + γ
and b =
γ
Z
. (1)
In the above demand function, pi is the price of variety i, M is the measure of Ω, and
P =

i∈Ω pidi is the aggregate price of all varieties. The slope b is exogenous, but the
intercept A is endogenous, depending on the degree of product substitution (β) and the
degree of product market competition (captured by the endogenous P and M).
The foreign country also has Z consumers and the same demand structure as China.
In particular, the demand function for variety i is
pi = A
∗ − bqi, where A∗ = αγ + βP
∗
βM∗ + γ
and b =
γ
Z
. (2)
In this demand function, M∗ is the measure of the set of varieties sold in the foreign
market, which is denoted by ΩF , and P
∗ =

i∈ΩF
pidi is the aggregate price of all varieties
in the foreign market.
Assume that tariffs take the form of iceberg transport cost. Let t (> 1) and t∗(> 1)
denote China’s tariff and the foreign country’s tariff on the differentiated goods imports,
respectively. Then, t units of a product need to be produced by a foreign firm to sell one
unit in the Chinese market and t∗ units of a product need to be produced by a Chinese
firm to sell one unit in the foreign market. There is free trade in the numeraire good
industry.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We should first derive the short-run equilibrium in which there is no entry and exit in the
differentiated goods industry. That is, the number of Chinese firms, n, and the number of
foreign firms, n∗, are fixed. In Subsection 3.3, we will examine the long-run equilibrium
which accommodates free entry and exit.
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3.1 Short-run Equilibrium
Let us first focus on the Chinese firms’ decisions. Each firm takes A and A∗ as given when
making its decisions. Suppose that a firm has a product with marginal cost equal to ci.
Then, if the product is sold to the domestic market, the optimal output maximizes the
profit of this product derived from the domestic market. The optimization problem is
max
q≥0
πH(ci) ≡ (A− bq)q − (m+ ci)q. (3)
The optimal quantity, price and profit for this product are, respectively,
qH(ci) =
A−m− ci
2b
, pH(ci) =
A+m+ ci
2
, and πH(ci) =
1
4b
(A−m− ci)2 . (4)
Stronger demand (i.e., a larger A) leads to a larger output, a higher price and a larger
profit.
If the product is sold in the foreign market, the optimal output maximizes the profit
of this product derived from the foreign market. Mathematically, we have
max
q≥0
πF (ci) ≡ (A∗ − bq)q −mq − cit∗q. (5)
The optimal quantity, price and profit of this product are, respectively,
qF (ci) =
A∗ −m− cit∗
2b
, pF (ci) =
A∗ +m+ cit∗
2
, and πF (ci) =
1
4b
(A∗ −m− cit∗)2 .
(6)
We now turn to derive the optimal total product scope and optimal export product
scope. Suppose that a firm decides to introduce a range of products, [0, s], which is called
the firm’s total product scope. We will provide the condition later to focus on the case
where a firm will not introduce a product which is exported to the foreign market, but
not sold to the domestic market. Then, a firm’s export products are a subset of its total
products. Let [0, e] be the set of all its export products, called the firm’s export product
scope.6 If e < s, then there exist some products (i ∈ (e, s]) which are sold in the domestic
6Due to the decreasing efficiency in [0, s], if a firm exports product i ∈ [0, s], it will export all products
j < i.
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market not exported.
We can write a firm’s total profit as a function of s
π(s) =
 s
0
1
4b
(A−m− ci)2 di+
 e
0
1
4b
(A∗ −m− cit∗)2 di− ks. (7)
The firm chooses s to maximize the above profit. Let us focus on the more interesting
case in which k is not too big such that e < s. Then, the first order condition is
π′(s) =
1
4b
(A−m− c− θs)2 − k = 0.
The second order condition, π′(s) < 0, is clearly satisfied. We obtain the optimal total
product scope
s˜ =
A−m− c− 2√bk
θ
. (8)
The total product scope is larger with stronger market demand (A), lower resource re-
quirement to manage the production and sales (m), lower cost of product introduction
(k), higher productivity of the core competency (c), and slower decline of productivity of
the non-core competency products (θ).
Given e < s˜, the optimal export product scope is simply determined by the zero profit
condition of the least efficient product’s export, i.e., πF (e˜) = 0, which yields
e˜ =
A∗ −m− ct∗
θt∗
. (9)
The export product scope is larger with stronger market demand (A∗), lower resource
requirement to manage the production and sales (m), higher productivity of the core
competency (c), slower decline of productivity of the non-core competency products (θ),
and lower foreign tariff (t∗).
We now turn to the foreign firms. In the Chinese market, a foreign firm chooses its
output to maximize its profit (A− bq∗H)q∗H − tq∗H . The optimal quantity, price and profit
of the firm in the Chinese market are, respectively,
q∗H =
A− t
2b
, p∗H =
A+ t
2
, and π∗H =
1
4b
(A− t)2. (10)
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In the foreign market, the foreign firm chooses output to maximize its profit (A∗ −
bq∗F )q
∗
F . The optimal quantity, price and profit of the firm in the foreign market are,
respectively,
q∗F =
A∗
2b
, p∗F =
A∗
2
, and π∗F =
1
4b
A∗2. (11)
Finally, we determine the equilibrium A and A∗. To determine A = αγ+βPβM+γ , we need
to first calculate M and P . Recall that all Chinese firms are identical and there is no free
entry and exit. Thus, M = s˜n+ n∗.
From (4), we obtain the aggregate price of each Chinese firm in the Chinese market
p˜H =
 s˜
0
pH(ci)di =
1
2
(A+m+ c)s˜+
1
4
θs˜2.
Each foreign firm’s price in the Chinese market is given in (10). Thus, the aggregate price
in the Chinese market is
P =
1
4

2(A+m+ c)ns˜+ θns˜2 + 2(A+ t)n∗

.
Using the above results in A = αγ+βPβM+γ yields the following condition that determines
the equilibrium A:
2 (n∗ + δ + ns˜)A− αγ − 2(m+ c)ns˜− θns˜2 − 2tn∗ = 0. (12)
By substituting in s˜ from (8) to the above equality, we obtain that the equilibrium A is a
solution to the following equation
A2 + 2

(n∗ + δ)
θ
n
−m− c

A+

(m+ c)2 − 4bk − 2 (n∗t− αδ) θ
n

= 0,
where δ ≡ 2γ
β
is used to simplify notation. Eliminating the negative value solution, we
obtain the unique solution to A as
A =
√
a0 − (n∗ + δ) θ
n
+m+ c, (13)
where
a0 = (n
∗ + δ)2

θ
n
2
+ 2 [αδ + n∗t− (m+ c) (n∗ + δ)] θ
n
+ 4bk. (14)
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In the foreign market, the total number of products sold is M∗ = e˜n + n∗. The
aggregate price of each Chinese exporter is
p˜F =
 e˜
0
pF (ci)di =
1
2
( A∗ + m+ ct∗)e˜+
1
4
t∗θe˜2.
Each foreign firm’s price is given in (11). Thus, the aggregate price in the foreign market
is
P ∗ =
1
2
( A∗ +m+ ct∗)e˜n+
1
4
t∗θe˜2n+
1
2
A∗n∗.
Using the above results in A∗ = αγ+βP
∗
βM∗+γ yields the following condition that determines
the equilibrium A∗:
2 (n∗ + δ) A∗ − αγ − 2( m+ ct∗)ne˜− θt∗ne˜2 = 0.
Substituting in e˜ from (9) to the above condition, we obtain the following equation that
determines the equilibrium A∗:
A∗2 + 2

(n∗ + δ)
θt∗
n
−m− ct∗

A∗ +

(m+ ct∗)2 − 2αδθt
∗
n

= 0,
This condition yields the equilibrium A∗(excluding the negative value solution) as below
A∗ =
	
a∗0 − (n∗ + δ)
θt∗
n
+m+ ct∗, (15)
where
a∗0 = (n
∗ + δ)2

θt∗
n
2
+ 2 [αδ − (m+ ct∗) (n∗ + δ)] θt
∗
n
. (16)
In summary, the equilibrium A, given in (13), is a function of China’s tariff t, and the
equilibrium A∗, given in (15), is a function of the foreign tariff t∗. Substituting A in (8)
to obtain the optimal total product scope s˜ as a function of t. Substituting A∗ in (9) to
obtain the optimal export product scope e˜ as a function of t∗.
Finally, we check the conditions for e˜ < s˜ in equilibrium. A direct comparison results
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in the following inequality

(n∗ + δ)2

θ
n
2
+ 2 [(αδ − δm−mn∗)− c (n∗ + δ) + n∗t] θ
n
+ 4bk −
√
4bk
>


(n∗ + δ)2

θ
n
2
+ 2

(αδ − δm−mn∗) 1
t∗
− c (n∗ + δ)

θ
n
. (17)
The right-hand side of (17) is decreasing in t∗ if and only ifm < αδ
n∗+δ . To ensure e˜ < s˜, we
assume that (17) holds. In particular, we assume that t∗ is sufficiently large if m < αδn∗+δ .
Under this condition, e˜ will be quite small. If the Chinese firm is not very efficient in
management, its export profit will not be large any way, and so e˜ will not be big. If,
however, it is very efficient in management, its export profit will be large unless t∗ is large.
Thus, a large t∗ helps control the size of e˜.
3.2 Trade Liberalization
We analyze two types of trade liberalization and their effects on the Chinese firms’ export
product scope. The first type of liberalization is the tariff reduction in China (t), and the
second type is the tariff reduction in the foreign country (t∗).
Let us first look at de˜dt . Using the expression of e˜ from (9) and that of A
∗ from (15) and
(16) we immediately know that t does not have any direct effect on e˜ when it is given by
(9). However, this optimal e˜ is obtained under the condition e < s. The Chinese tariff cut
may eventually lead to a condition under which this equality does not hold. Note, from
(8), (13) and (14), we obtain
ds˜
dt
=
1
θ
dA
dt
=
1
2θ
√
a0
da0
dt
=
n∗
n
√
a0
> 0.
Hence, when there is a tariff cut in China, Chinese firms reduce their total product scope
(s˜). When there are continuous tariff cuts, the product scope eventually will drops down
to equal to the export product scope (e˜). Once e˜ = s˜, the optimal product scope is no
longer given in (8). We prove in Appendix that ds˜dt =
de˜
dt > 0.
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We next turn to de˜dt∗ . From from (9), (15) and (16), we obtain
e˜ =

(n∗ + δ)2
1
n2
+ 2 [αδ − (m+ ct∗) (n∗ + δ)] 1
nθt∗
− (n∗ + δ) 1
n
.
Thus,
de˜
dt∗

< 0 if m < αδn∗+δ
> 0 if m > αδn∗+δ .
(18)
The above analysis allows us to establish the following proposition:
Proposition 1. (i) In response to drastic cuts of import tariffs in China, all Chinese
firms reduce their export product scope.
(ii) In response to tariff cuts by the foreign country, Chinese firms with efficient man-
agement in production and sales will expand their export product scope whereas those with
inefficient management in production and sales will reduce their export product scope.
Intuition. The conditions in (18) do not depend on c.
Focusing on foreign tariffs, the proposition says that it is the management cost, rather
than production cost, that determines the response of a firm. This prediction is consis-
tent with the empirical finding that high productivity firms expand export product scope
because usually a very efficient firm is both productive in production and efficient in man-
agement. But the proposition says that a firm with high production productivity but low
management efficiency will reduce its export product scope.
3.3 Long-run Equilibrium
We now examine whether the main results, especially Proposition 1, still hold under
general equilibrium in which the number of Chinese firms and that of foreign firms are
endogenously determined.
Suppose that there is a cost of entry to the industry by a firm in any country, denoted
by f . The possible effect of allowing for free entry: lowering Chinese tariff will induce
more foreign firm’s entry and reduce the number of Chinese firms. This is going to affect
13
the total number of firms and products, M . The question is whether M will be larger or
smaller than the case of fixed number. My guess is M will go up because the market is
more competitive (reducing tariff), that is, the increasing of foreign firms is higher than
the exit of Chinese firms. If this is correct, then it is more likely to result in Chinese firms
reducing export product scope.
By the same reason, when the foreign tariff drops, more Chinese firms enter, and some
foreign firms exit. The new entry must be higher than the exit. This will raise M∗, which
make it more likely to reduce export product scope.
[TO BE CONTINUED]
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we first introduce our empirical specification, then we construct the mea-
sures for the key variables in the estimations, and finally we describe the data.
4.1 Estimation Framework and Measures
A firm may produce multiple and differentiated products, called a firm’s total product
scope, or (product) extensive margin. A firm may export a set (or all) of its products,
which is called the export product scope, or export (product) extensive margin. The focus
of the present study is on the effects of trade liberalization on individual firms’ export
product scope. The type of trade liberalization we consider is tariffs reduction. There
are two groups of tariffs that potentially affect a Chinese firm’s export product scope.
On the one hand, when the firm sells its products in the domestic (Chinese) market, it
faces import competition. The home country’s import tariffs affect the domestic market
competition and so the firm’s profit from the market, which in turn affects its optimal total
product scope. As the firm adjusts its total product scope in response to home country’s
tariff changes, its export product scope may also change. We call the home country’s tariff
the home tariff, denoted by HT. On the other hand, when the firm sells to the foreign
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markets, its export profit are affected by the foreign countries’ import tariffs, which we call
the foreign tariff, denoted by FT. Consequently, the firm’s export product scope will be
affected. While a country has many tariff lines, it is clear that tariffs that are not relevant
to a firm may not have strong impact on the firm’s export product scope. Accordingly,
we will construct firm-specific tariff in order to better gauge the effects of tariff changes
on firms’ export product scope.
In addition to tariffs, a firm’s productivity level is also an important factor which
affects its export product scope (see Qiu and Zhou, 2012). Therefore, we establish the
following empirical equation
Sit = β0 + β1TFPit + β2HTit + β3FTit + θΨit + ǫit, (19)
where Sit is firm i’s export product scope, TFPit firm i’ total factor productivity, HTit the
home (Chinese) tariff level firm i faces, and FTit the foreign tariff level firm i faces, all in
year t. In addition, Ψit denotes a vector of control variables including firm i’s export mar-
ket size (foreign countries’ GDP), ownership type (state-owned enterprise, multinational
firm, or other), and trade mode (processing trade or ordinary trade).
We next turn to describing the construction of firm-specific tariffs. For home tariffs,
suppose that firm i produces a set of products, Si, for the domestic market. The firm’s
profit will be affected directly by all tariff lines in its product set, among which a tariff
line will have a greater effect if the firm has a larger share of the corresponding product in
its total domestic sales. This suggests that the firm-specific tariff should be the average of
all relevant tariffs weighted by the share of each product’s sales. Unfortunately, data on
product-level domestic sales are not available. Alternatively, we adopt a less satisfactory
approach by using the share of a firm’s export to proxy the share of its domestic sales.
Specifically, we introduce the following measure as firm i’s home tariff:
HTit =

k∈Eit

Xkit
k∈Eit
Xkit

τkt , (20)
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where Eit is the set of firm i’s export products, X
k
it is the export sales of product k by
firm i, and τkt is the home country’s ad valorem tariff on product k, all year t. Some
discussions on this measure are in order. First, the home tariff on a product which is
produced by a firm for the domestic market only does not show up in HTit. This is in
fact desirable because our left-hand-side variable is a firm’s export product scope and it
is very unlikely that tariffs on other products will affect these products’ profits. Second,
HTit cannot capture the competition effects either for pure domestic firms that do not
have any exports or pure exporting firms that completely export their products. We hence
drop these both types of firms in all estimates.
Third, HTit does not include tariffs on other products which the firm does not produce.
There are two concerns related to this observation. On the one hand, when tariffs on
a firm’s competing products change, the firm’s existing products’ profits and potential
products’ profitability are affected, which may change the firm’s decision on its product
margin, i.e., shrinking existing product lines or introducing new products. To capture this
effect, our regressions begin from using an industry-wide, as opposed to firm-specific, tariff
to replace HTit. On the other hand, HTit ignores tariffs on intermediate goods. Obviously,
changes in the intermediate goods’ tariffs will affect the final goods’ profits, which then
affect a firm’s decision on the number of its final goods. However, it is the objective
of the present study to analyze the effects of trade liberalization that impacts the final
goods market directly, that is, the competition effects. Still, for the sake of completeness,
we control for the cost effects associated with tariffs changes on intermediate goods as a
robustness check.
The construction of firm-specific foreign tariffs is more complicated than home tariffs
because many firms not only export multiple products, but also export them to multiple
countries, with different subsets of products to different countries. The measure must
capture the relative importance of different foreign country’s tariffs on a Chinese firm’s
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export. To this end, we propose the following measure for FTit:
FTit =

k∈Eit
 Xkit
k∈Eit
Xkit

c∈Cit

Xkcit
Xkit

τkct
 , (21)
where τkct is product k’s ad valorem tariff imposed by country c, X
kc
it is the value of
firm i’s export of product k to country c, and Xkit =

c∈C X
c
ikt, all in year t. The ratio
Xkcit /X
k
it represents the share of firm i’s product k exported to country c, which captures
the relative importance of τkct in affecting firm i’s product k export. Thus,

c∈Cit
(
Xkcit
Xkit
)τkct
is the weighted average of foreign tariffs on product k for firm i.
Finally, we turn to TFPit. While there are many ways of measuring a firm’s TFP, or
productivity, we adopt the Olley-Pakes (1996) approach to estimate each Chinese firm’s
TFP (refer to TFP1).7 To better reflect China’s reality, we make some modifications to
the standard Olley-Pakes approach. First, following Brandt et al. (2012) and Feenstra et
al. (2013), we use deflated output and input prices at the firm-product level to measure
TFP. Second, we use a firm’s real capital depreciation to construct its real investment (the
perpetual inventory method).8 Third, we consider the effect of China’s WTO accession
in 2001 and firms’ processing behavior in the TFP realization. Appendix C provides a
detailed description of our augmented Olley-Pakes TFP measures.
7The Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) approach is also popular in the literature to construct TFP in which
materials (i.e., intermediate inputs) are used as a proxy variable. As argued by Yu (2011), this approach
is appropriate for firms in countries not using a large amount of imported intermediate inputs, but not
appropriate for China as Chinese firms substantially rely on imported intermediate inputs, which have
prices that are significantly different from those of domestic intermediate inputs (Helpern et al., 2011).
8Since the firm-level dataset only provides the book value of the firm’s capital stock, we need to obtain
the original value of the firm’s capital stock for TFP estimation. To do so, we adopt the following expression
At = AoΠ
t
s=o(1 + rs) where At is the book value of the firm’s capital stock in year t, Ao is the original
value of the firm’s capital stock when it was purchased in year o, rs is the estimated province-industry-level
growth rate of nominal capital stock in year s obtained from Brandt et al. (2012). As At and rs are known
for each firm, the firm’s original nominal book value can be traced out accordingly. There are around 40%
observations missing investment data. However, this is not a problem since our estimation results are not
changed by using other measures of TFP, which are not reported in the text to save space but available
upon request.
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4.2 Data and Summary Statistics
Regression (19) and construction of HT, FT and TFP require extensive information of
all variables. We will make use of the following three highly disaggregate panel datasets:
product-level tariff data of each country, firm-level production data, and firm and product-
level trade data.
First, tariffs. The WTO official webpage provides tariffs at HS six-digit level from all
WTO member countries/regions.9 The following tariff data for each product category are
all available: number of ad valorem (AV) duties and non-AV duties; average, minimum,
and maximum AV duties, respectively; percentage of duty free; and the bound duty. For
the purpose of our analysis, the average AV duty is the most suitable one and so is included
in our dataset.
Second, firm production data. China’s National Bureau of Statistics maintains a
dataset based on the annual survey of large manufacturing enterprises in China. This
dataset, called Chinese Manufacturing Enterprises (CME) dataset includes two types of
manufacturing firms, which include state-owned enterprises (SOE), both small and large,
and non-SOEs whose annual sales are more than five million RMB, with about 162, 885
firms in the year 2000 and 301, 961 in 2006.10 It contains information of more than 100
financial variables from each firm’s accounting statement. Although this data set contains
rich information, there are obvious omissions and errors. As in Feenstra et al. (2013),
we clean the dataset as follows. We drop the observations (i.e., firms) if the key financial
variables (such as total assets, net value of fixed assets, sales, and gross value of indus-
trial output) are missing, or the number of employees are not higher than 8.11 We also
9Data can be accessed via http://tariffdata.wto.org/ReportersAndProducts.aspx. Note that TRAINS
data generally suffer from missing values problems, particularly regarding the tariffs imposed by other
countries for Chinese exports. The product-destination-year combinations that have missing tariffs are
hence dropped.
10 In fact, the aggregate data for the manufacturing sector in the annual China’s Statistical Yearbook are
compiled from the CEM dataset.
11The reason of chosing eight workers as a threshold is that firms with less than eight workers fall under
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delete the following observations according to the basic rules of the Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles: (i) liquid assets are higher than total assets, (ii) total fixed assets
are larger than total assets, (iii) the net value of fixed assets is larger than total assets,
(4) the firm’s identification number is missing, or (5) there is an invalid established time.
Third, export data. China’s Customs maintains a highly disaggregate trade database
which records each transaction of international trade. It contains a large variety of infor-
mation about each trading firm including each exporting product’s price, quantity, value,
and destination. Product information is available at the HS eight-digit level. We use
only part of this information to calculate each Chinese firm’s export product scope. It is
observed that some firms export products from different industries. As our focus is on
within industry multiproduct analysis, we assign a firm to an industry at HS 2-digit level
in which the firm has most number of products. We drop firms out from the sample if
they include other industries’ products.12
Our study requires us to merge the China Customs dataset and the CME dataset.
As these two datasets use completely different firm-identification systems, we have to
find various ways to do the matching. By using firms’ (Chinese) names, zip codes and
telephone numbers, we are able to match 76,946 firms.13 They account for more than 40%
of manufacturing firms reported in the CME dataset and around 70% of the export value
reported in the customs dataset. This representation is quite comparable to Bernard et
al. (2009) for the US data and Ma et al. (2011) for the Chinese data.14
Data summary statistics are provided in Table 1. Export product scopes have a very
different legal regime, as mentioned in Brandt et al. (2012). We adopt this criterion for the consideration
that a very small company may not have a good accounting system/report. However, our results are not
sensitive to this critical level.
12An alternative way to deal with this issue is to drop other industries’ products when calculating the
firm’s export product scope. Our estimation results are not changed by using such an alternative approach.
Such estimation results are not reported to save space, but available upon request.
13The same matching is also done in Yu and Tian (2012).
14Our merged dataset has higher mean of sales than the full-sample NBS dataset, indicating that larger
firms are more likely to be matched.
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large variation: The minimum of export product scope is one (i.e., a single product)
whereas the maximum is up to 527 products. Around 86% of Chinese firms (in our merged
dataset) export more than a single product during 2000-2006 whereas the rest 14% export
a single product. Moreover, around a half of the firms export less than five products, 75%
of the firms export less than nine products, and only 1% of the firms export more than
50 products. The average home tariffs is slightly higher than the average foreign tariffs,
suggesting China’s average import tariffs are close to the average level of the rest of the
world after China’s accession to the WTO.15
[Insert Table 1 Here]
5 Estimates
5.1 Benchmark Estimates
We start our regressions by using industry-level home tariffs for two reasons. First, this can
ensure that our firm-specific tariffs measure would not generate qualitative difference from
the traditional industry tariffs measures. Second, this approach is justified by the following
hypothesis: A firm adjusts its product scope not only responding to trade liberalization in
its existing tariff lines, but also responding to trade liberalization in other tariff lines. The
reason is not difficult to see. Suppose that a firm produces products x and y and there
is a large reduction in product z’s tariff. Then producing z becomes profitable for the
firm. However, if the firm produces z, it may dilute its profit from existing products (e.g.,
drawing resources away from production of existing products). Thus, the total product
scope may go up or down, depending on how much the existing products’ profits are
affected.
Estimates in Table 2 start from a pooling OLS regression by using simple-average
15Note that the maxium foreign tariffs is up to 960 percent since some China’s trading partners (e.g.,
Egypt) still impose extremely high tariffs in some industries. We hence drop the top 1% outlier from the
sample, yielding a maximumn foreign tariffs with a reasonable number (41.5%). Including such outliers
does not change our estimation results at all.
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industry home tariffs at HS 2-digit level whereas abstracting away foreign tariffs and input
tariffs. Industry home tariffs are found to be positively associated with firm’s export scope,
suggesting that firms reduce their export scope in response to home tariffs cut. Meanwhile,
our data show a clear pattern that most firms export a small number of products while
a very small fraction of firms export a very large number of products. This suggests that
the dependent variable does not follow the normal distribution, which is assumed when
using the OLS approach. Thus, the OLS result reported in column (1) of Table 2 may be
biased.
The count-data estimates would be more reliable because the product scopes are non-
negative integers (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Since Poisson distribution is the most
popular discrete distribution to capture the characteristics of various count data, we first
derive the Poisson estimate (with a clustered robust standard error). Specifically, the
dependent variable is assumed to have a probability function f(s, µ) = exp(−µ)µ
s
s! , where
µ = exp(X
′
β) andX denotes the vector of independent variables. We report the regression
results in column (2) of Table 2. It turns out that the main results obtained from OLS
remain valid. In particular, both the home tariffs and foreign tariffs have positive and
significant effects on export product scopes
Although Poisson distribution is a popular approach, it may not be the best represen-
tation of our sample distribution. If our sample follows a Poisson distribution, we should
expect that the mean and variance of firm’s export product scope are identical and equal
to µ. However, our data reveals that the variance of the sample (var(s) = 96.9) is around
15 times larger than its mean (s¯ = 6.5), indicating that Poisson distribution is not a
good distribution to represent our data. Moreover, the test of the goodness of fit for the
Poisson model reports an extremely large χ2 value (607,445), which double-confirms the
inappropriateness of Poisson distribution for our dependent variable.
We then appeal to the negative binomial distribution because it allows the sample to ex-
hibit a pattern of over-dispersion. Note that the probability density function of negative bi-
21
nomial distribution has the following form: f(s, µ) = Γ(α
−1µ+s)
Γ(α−1µ)Γ(s+1)(
α−1µ
α−1µ+µ)
1
α

µ
α−1µ+µ
s
,
where µ = exp(X
′
β) as in the Poisson distribution above and Γ(·) is the Gamma function.
Here the mean of the scope is s¯ whereas the variance can be over dispersed to (1+αs¯)s¯. In
fact, when drawing a graph based on the proportion of firms with different export product
scope (see Figure 1), we notice that the negative binomial distribution approximates the
observed distribution much better than the Poisson distribution. Since most firms have
a scope less than 10, we assume 10 as the maximum value of the discrete level.16 We
report the regression results in column (3) of Table 2. We find that the over-dispersion
parameter α generated by the likelihood ratio test is significantly different from zero (we
obtain α = .660 from the regression), indicating that negative binomial distribution is a
good assumption.17 Importantly, the coefficient of home tariffs is positive and statistically
significant. Furthermore, some other time-variant variables such as exchange rate may
affect trade and so firms’ optimal export product scopes. We include year-specific fixed
effects in the regressions. Meanwhile, we include firm-specific fixed effects to control for
the effects of firm-variant variables such as unobservable managerial ability.18 The nega-
tive binomial estimates are reported in column (4). The coefficient of home tariffs, again,
is positive and highly significant. Note that when year fixed effect is introduced, another
control variable, China’s GDP, will be dropped automatically.
We then include foreign tariffs, FTit, in column (5) and find its coefficient positive and
significant, suggesting that home firms reduce their export scope in response to foreign
tariffs cut. Finally, trade liberalization in output market affects competition and so firms
respond by changing their product scope. However, trade liberalization in input market
affects costs and firms may also adjust their product scope. To control for the possible
16Note that changing such a maximum number does not change our estimation results.
17We have also performed the regression based on gamma distribution, which generates very similar
results as the negative binomial distribution. Such results are not reported in the table to save space, but
available upon request.
18Note that firm-specific fixed effects in the negative binomial model apply to the distribution of the
dispersion parameter (Hardin and Hilbe, 2003).
22
cost effects, we include the "home input tariffs" variable. It is difficult to construct a
precise firm specific "home input tariffs" variable especially for China as not all firms
facing the same effective tariff rates even if they import the same inputs. As it is well
known, processing imports are duty-free in China. Given that a firm could engage in both
processing imports (P ) and non-processing imports (O), we adopt the following index of
firm-specific input tariffs (FITit) suggested by Yu (2011) as our "home input tariffs" for
firm i:
FITit =

k∈O
mki,initial_year
k∈M m
k
i,initial_year
τkt , (22)
where mki,initial_year is firm i’s imports of product k in the first year the firm appears in
the sample. Note that O∪P =M where M is the set of the firm’s total imports. The set
of processing imports does not appear in Eq. (22) because processing imports are duty-
free. The firm’s input tariffs are constructed by using time-invariant weights to avoid the
well-known endogeneity of weighted tariffs: imports are negatively associated with tariffs.
For products with prohibitive tariffs, their imports and the associated import share would
be zero. Accordingly, if the import weight is measured in the current period, the measure
of firm tariffs would face a downward bias. Therefore, following Topalova and Khandelwal
(2011), we measure the import weight for each product using data for the firm’s first year
in the sample.
The last column of Table 2 reports the negative binomial estimates when "home input
tariffs" is included as a control variable. It shows that trade liberalization in intermediate
goods imports tends to lower export product scope. The inclusion of such a control variable
would not alter the effects and significance of the two key variables, that is, home tariffs
and foreign tariffs.
We now turn to other control variables. All estimates in Table 2 show that more
productive firms have a larger export product scope. This finding is consistent with the
23
prediction of all theoretical studies on multiproduct firms. It is also found by Eaton et
al. (2011) from French data. Like in all gravity models of international trade, GDP of
both the importing and exporting countries have a positive effects on the flows of trade
between the trading partners. In our regression based on all three distributions, we find
that both increases in China’s GDP and foreign countries’ GDP raise Chinese firms’ export
product scopes. To better capture the effects of foreign countries’ GDP, we construct the
firm-specific GDP using the share of a firm’s export to each country as the weight of
the corresponding importing country’s GDP. Once controlling for firm-specific and year-
specific fixed effects, a firm’s capital-labor ratio has a negative effect on its export product
scope. Other things equal, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have larger export product
scope than non-SOEs; and firms engaging in processing trade have smaller export product
scopes than other firms only engaging in ordinary trade.19
[Table 2 Here]
We replace industry-level home tariffs with firm-specific home tariffs as measured by
Eq. (20) in negative binomial regressions of Table 3. As shown in column (1), the co-
efficient of firm-specific home tariffs is still positive and significant, suggesting that our
findings are qualitatively robust by using different measure of home tariffs. Equally im-
portantly, the coefficient of home tariffs in column (1) is smaller than its counterpart in
the last column of Table 2, indicating that using industry tariffs would create a upward
estimation bias. However, one may concern that firm-specific home tariffs would not be
impotent to capture the roles of pure domestic firms and pure exporting firms. To rule
out such cases, we first drop pure domestic firms in column (2), pure exporting firms in
column (3), and both in column (4). Our estimation results are still robust in all such
experiments: the coefficients of home tariffs and foreign tariffs are positive and statis-
19Note that some firms change their types of ownership and shipment mode (i.e., processing or ordinary
exports). Hence, SOE indicator, foreign indicator, and processing indicator are not dropped from the
fixed-effects estimates. We do not report the transitional probability matrixes in the text to save space,
but available upon request.
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tically significant. When there is domestic trade liberalization, home firms reduce their
export product scope; in response to foreign countries’ trade liberalization, home firms
also reduce their export product scope.20
[Table 3 Here]
5.2 Estimates Using Alternative Measures
When we construct the two key variables, we use the current year’s tariffs and the weighted
based on current year’s production value. There are two potential problems. First, firms
may not have sufficient time to adjust to the tariff changes in the same year. Second, as
we use the current year’s trade value as the weight to construct the firm specific tariffs, it
may lead to an endogeneity problem. For example, if a firm drops an variety x this year
due to tariff changes, variety x’s tariff will not show up in the tariffs defined previously,
which is not correct. We now examine whether our main results (Table 3) are sensitive to
our tariff measures.
There are many ways to tackle the above problems. As it is common in the literature,
one way to avoid the endogeneity problem, and at the same time to address the first
problem, is to use a previous year’s tariffs to replace the current year’s tariffs. This is
indicated by "home tariffs (lag)" and "foreign tariffs (lag)", respectively. In particular, we
construct the following measure for our firm-specific home tariffs:
HTAltit =

k
(
vkit−1
k v
k
it−1
)τkt ,
where the weight of domestic sales is from the previous year’s sales (one-period lag in
weight). The fixed-effects estimates in column (1) of Table 4 indicate that both the home
tariffs and foreign tariffs are still positive and significant. We construct the foreign tariffs
20One potential problem is that trade liberalization in both China and foreign countries take place at
the same time due to the continuous effort of the WTO, which suggesting a possible correlation between
HT and FT . We check this and find that this is not a worry given that the simple correlation between
the two variable is 0.01.
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following the same approach and rerun the regression in column (2). In particular, the
alternative firm-specific foreign tariffs (FTAltit ) is measured as follows:
FTAltit =

k∈Eit
 Xkit−1
k∈Eit−1
Xkit

c∈Cit

Xkcit−1
Xkit−1

τkct
 .
The results are basically the same as those in column (1).
As argued previously, a firm may respond to the previous year’s tariff changes, but
not the current year’s tariff changes. This suggests that we should use a different tariff
measure like the following:

k(v
k
it−2/

k v
k
it−2)τ
k
t−1. This is a measure using tariffs of
the previous year and production of the the year before for the weights. Using these
home and foreign tariffs in the negative binomial regression, we find that the qualitative
results remain unchanged, as reported in column (4). The last column adds the alternative
firm-specific foreign tariffs (FTAltit ) in the regression and yields the same results.
[Table 4 Here]
5.3 Effect by Managerial Efficiency
Our theoretical model predicts that the effects of foreign tariffs reduction on export scope
differ by managerial efficiency. High (low) management cost firms reduce (increase) their
scope in response to foreign tariff cut regardless of their production productivity.
To this end, Table 5 first introduces two indicators of managerial efficiency in the
regression: low managerial efficiency (i.e., high overhead expenses) and high managerial
efficiency (i.e., low overhead expenses) indicators. Firm’s overhead expenses is used to
proxy its managerial efficiency following the conventional measures in accounting. A high
overhead indicator takes one if a firm’s overhead expenses (in logarithm) is higher than
the top 25th quantile of all firms’ overhead expenses (in logarithm) and zero otherwise.
Analogously, a low overhead indicator takes one if a firm’s overhead expenses (in logarithm)
is lower than the bottom 25th quantile of all firms’ overhead expenses (in logarithm) and
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zero otherwise. All firms are accordingly separated into three groups: high, low, and
middle efficiency groups.
As suggested by our theoretical model, production productivity is also an important
factor to determine firm’s export scope. We hence shall include it in the regressions in
Table 5. However, an empirical identification challenge occurs. The conventional TFP
measure is a "Solow" residual which also takes firm’s managerial efficiency into account.
We need to separate firm’s true production productivity from its regular TFP measure so
that both true production productivity and managerial efficiency can be identified. For
this purpose, inspired by Feenstra et al. (2013), we construct an ex-ante productivity
measure (TFP2) which differs from the standard ex-post productivity measure (TFP1)
but is closer to the framework of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008). To motivate this from
the Olley-Pakes (1996) framework, consider a standard Cobb-Douglas gross production
function:
lnYit = αk lnKit + αl lnLit + αm lnMit + xit + εit, (23)
where Yit, Kit, Lit, Mit and xit are firm i’s sales, capital, labor, intermediate inputs and
productivity in year t, respectively.21 The conventional measure of productivity is to take
the difference between log output and log factor inputs times their estimated coefficients:
TFP1it ≡ xit = lnYit − αˆk lnKit − αˆl lnLit − αˆm lnMit. (24)
Under this approach, firm productivity (TFP1) is clearly correlated with the ex-post pro-
ductivity shock (εjt) such as managerial efficiency.
As suggested by Feenstra et al. (2013), we can construct a new measure of productivity.
Suppose that investment Vit in the Olley-Pakes depends on the anticipated productivity
TFP2it of the firm according to a functional relation: Vit = g1(xit, lnKit, EXit, PEit,WTOt)
where EXit (PEit) is the export (processing export) indicator to measure whether firm i
exports (engages in processing exports) in year t, and WTOt is an indicator that equals
21Note that Feenstra et al. (2013) work on a value-added production function instead.
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one if the WTO agreement has occurred after 2001 and zero before that. Inverting this
relation, the anticipated productivity can be obtained as:
TFP2it = g
−1
1 (Vit, lnKit, EXit, PEit,WTOt), (25)
with a careful discussion in Appendix C. In this way, the measure of ex-ante productiv-
ity (TFP2), by construction, is independent of other unspecified factors such as firm’s
managerial efficiency inclusive in the error term εjt. Appendix Table A2 provides firm’s
TFP1 and TFP2 in each estimates associated with the coefficients of labor, capital, and
materials.
As shown in Column (1) of Table 5, high productivity firms have more export scopes.
Since our main interest is to see how firms with different managerial efficiency will adjust
their export product scope in response to foreign trade liberalization, we interact foreign
tariffs (FTit) with both high and low managerial efficiency indicators. Once again, we find
that both home tariffs and foreign tariffs variables have positive and statistically significant
coefficients as before. More importantly, the interaction between foreign tariffs and the
high managerial efficiency (i.e., low overhead) dummy is negative and significant, with a
much larger economic magnitude than the own coefficient of foreign tariffs, indicating that
the effect of foreign tariffs on export scope is negative (e.g., .003 − .774 < 0 in Column
(1)). Thus, foreign tariffs reduction increases export scope for high managerial efficiency
firms. By contrast, the coefficients of the interaction between foreign tariffs and the low
managerial efficiency (i.e., high overhead) indicator are positive and significant, suggesting
that foreign tariffs reduction reduces export scope for low managerial efficiency firms. This
observation also applies to the middle managerial efficiency firms. Column (2) controls for
firm’s input tariffs as measured by Eq. (22) and yields similar results to those in Column
(1). One may worry that whether our results are sensitive to the measure of firm-specific
home tariffs measure. We hence replace firm-specific home tariffs with industry-level home
tariffs in Columns (3)-(4) and find that all results remain robust.
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[Table 5 Here]
Thus far, we have seen rich evidence that both home tariffs cut and foreign tariffs cut
reduce firm’s export scope, respectively. More interestingly, high (low) management cost
firms reduce (increase) their scope in response to foreign tariff cut. For the latter finding,
one may be curious whether such a finding is driven by firm’s size given that large firms
usually have more overhead expenses. To address such a possible concern, we use firm’s
overhead expense relative to its size (measured by number of employees) as a measure of
firm’s managerial cost. That is, we use per-capita overhead expense in Table 6 to construct
high and low overhead indicators. Once again, we see that the net impact of foreign tariffs
cut on export scope is negative for firms with low overhead expenses but is positive for
firms with high overall expenses. This suggests that low (high) managerial efficiency firms
reduce (increase) their scope in response to foreign tariffs reduction.
[Table 6 Here]
6 Concluding Remarks
[TBA]
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Year 2000 2006
Export Product Scope 6.49 9.84 1 527
Annual Sales (RMB1,000) 150,053 1,061,312 5,000 1.57e+0.8
Number of Empolyees 479 1,687 8 157,213
Home Tariffs (Firm Level) 8.34 7.69 0 65.26
Home Tariffs (Industry Level) 11.72 5.59 0 58.75
Foreign Tariffs (Firm Level) 7.38 19.22 0 41.47
Home Input Tariffs (Firm Level) 2.12 3.88 0 90
Log China’s GDP 28.29 .265 27.81 28.62
Log Importers’ Weighted GDP 28.70 2.43 10.15 34.69
Per-capita Overhead Expenses 277.1 668.1 0 73,581
Log of Overhead Expenses 6.83 2.18 0 16.66
SOE Indicator .021 .141 0 1
Foreign Indicator .589 .491 0 1
Processing Indicator .286 .452 0 1
Notes: US$1 is equivalent to approximately 8.20 during 2000-2006.
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Table 2: Estimates of Tariffs on Scope using Industry Home Tariffs
Econometric Methods OLS Poisson Negative Binomial
Regressand: Export Product Scope (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Home Tariffs (Industry-Level) .302*** .035*** .039*** .014*** .013*** .009***
(39.14) (32.34) (63.22) (21.53) (20.86) (15.40)
Foreign Tariffs .007*** .003***
(21.07) (12.44)
Home Input Tariffs .313***
(4.70)
Log Firm TFP (TFP1) 1.955*** .206*** .276*** .106*** .104*** .054***
(15.75) (13.93) (27.96) (14.95) (14.63) (8.56)
Log China’s GDP 1.266*** .197*** .182***
(8.18) (8.58) (13.20)
Log Weighted GDP of Importers 1.303*** .214*** .150*** .127*** .129*** .109***
(64.47) (44.71) (133.10) (89.40) (90.36) (77.92)
Log Capital-Labor Ratio .175*** .024*** .012*** -.011*** -.012*** -.022***
(6.11) (4.46) (5.27) (-4.20) (-4.43) (-7.57)
Foreign Indicator .231*** .003 .055*** .122*** .123*** -0.014
(2.92) (0.16) (8.47) (13.04) (13.05) (-1.21)
SOE Indicator .877*** .129** .070*** .078*** .081*** 0.032
(3.11) (2.24) (3.15) (2.86) (2.98) (1.14)
Processing Indicator -.303*** -.073*** -.035*** -.023*** -.023*** -.052***
(-3.94) (-6.19) (-5.04) (-4.24) (-4.14) (-12.55)
Firm-specific Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 96,139 96,139 96,139 96,139 96,139 53,613
Note: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signifi-
cance at the 10(5) percent level.
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Table 3: Negative Binomial Estimates of Tariffs on Scope
Regressand: Export Product Scope (1) (2) (3) (4)
Home Tariffs .004*** .005*** .014*** .019***
(10.49) (11.61) (24.91) (26.13)
Foreign Tariffs .003*** .004*** .003*** .004***
(13.38) (12.35) (11.45) (10.38)
Home Input Tariffs .256*** .328*** .324*** .384***
(3.83) (3.98) (4.65) (4.06)
Log Firm TFP (TFP1) .053*** .065*** .066*** .097***
(8.85) (8.36) (9.87) (9.86)
Log Weighted GDP of Importers .110*** .110*** .120*** .124***
(80.07) (66.40) (80.21) (62.65)
Log Capital-Labor Ratio -.026*** -.027*** -.021*** -.018***
(-9.32) (-8.07) (-6.98) (-4.67)
Foreign Indicator -.006 -.034*** -.009 -.039***
(-0.50) (-2.69) (-0.79) (-2.84)
SOE Indicator .051* .026 .071** .059
(1.83) (0.77) (2.57) (1.64)
Processing Indicator -.053*** -.059*** -.048*** -.056***
(-13.26) (-11.93) (-11.33) (-9.44)
Firm-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pure Domestic Firms Dropped No Yes No Yes
Pure Exporting Firms Dropped No No Yes Yes
Prob.>χ2 .000 .000 .000 .000
Observations 59,975 51,288 51,744 43,057
Note: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signif-
icance at the 10(5) percent level. Home tariffs, foreign tariffs, home input tariffs are measured by using
Eq. (20), Eq. (21), and Eq. (22) respectively.
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Table 4: Negative Binomial Estimates with Alternative Tariffs Measures
Measure of Home Tariffs One-Lag in Weights Two-Lag in Weights &
One-Lag in Tariffs
Regressand: Export Product Scope (1) (2) (3) (4)
Home Tariffs 0.010*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(14.12) (15.25) (14.74) (9.70)
Foreign Tariffs 0.006*** 0.006***
(12.36) (12.44)
Foreign Tariffs (One-Lag in Weight) 0.004*** 0.004***
(6.04) (6.57)
Firm Input Tariffs 0.003*** 0.003* 0.003*** 0.004**
(3.04) (1.83) (2.88) (2.25)
Log Firm TFP (TFP1) 0.107*** 0.151*** 0.107*** 0.155***
(9.31) (7.41) (9.12) (7.31)
Log Weighted GDP of Importers 0.135*** 0.143*** 0.136*** 0.147***
(60.57) (42.10) (60.25) (42.26)
Foreign Indicator -0.039*** -0.052*** -0.044*** -0.063***
(-2.61) (-2.58) (-2.98) (-3.15)
SOE Indicator 0.043 0.023 0.037 0.018
(1.10) (0.38) (0.94) (0.29)
Processing Indicator -0.025*** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.028**
(-3.56) (-2.60) (-3.41) (-2.33)
Firm-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob.>χ2 .000 .000 .000 .000
Observations 37,425 20,490 37,425 20,490
Note: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *,**,*** indicates
significance at the 10,5, and 1 percent level. Pure processing firms are dropped in all columns. Home tariff
indices in Columns (1)-(2) are measured as

k(
vkit−1
k v
k
it−1
)τkt whereas home tariff indices in Columns
(3)-(4) are measured as

k(
vkit−2
k v
k
it−2
)τkt−1. Firm foreign tariffs is measured by Eq. (21) whereas foreign
tariffs with one-lag in weight is measured as

k∈Eit

Xkit−1
k∈Eit−1
Xkit

c∈Cit

Xkcit−1
Xkit−1

τkct

. Pure domestic
firms and pure exporting firms are dropped from all estimates.
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Table 5: Impact of Foreign Tariffs on Scope by Log of Overhead Expenses
Measure of Home Tariffs Firm-Level Tariffs Industry-Level Tariffs
Regressand: Export Product Scope (1) (2) (3) (4)
Home Tariffs 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(29.49) (26.69) (17.08) (15.14)
Foreign Tariffs 0.003*** -0.000 0.002*** -0.000
(5.61) (-0.28) (4.54) (-0.58)
Foreign Tariffs×High Overhead Indicator 0.689*** 0.596*** 0.736*** 0.607***
(12.27) (9.09) (12.39) (8.86)
Foreign Tariffs×Low Overhead Indicator -0.774*** -0.284 -0.706*** -0.099
(-7.00) (-1.61) (-5.81) (-0.51)
Firm Input Tariffs 0.003*** 0.003***
(3.16) (3.58)
Log Firm TFP (TFP2) 0.036*** 0.023* 0.033*** 0.019
(3.02) (1.65) (2.63) (1.33)
Log Weighted GDP of Importers 0.132*** 0.122*** 0.134*** 0.124***
(80.31) (62.52) (78.78) (61.63)
Foreign Indicator 0.105*** -0.030** 0.101*** -0.034**
(9.96) (-2.14) (9.22) (-2.40)
SOE Indicator 0.032 0.038 0.005 0.002
(1.12) (1.08) (0.18) (0.04)
Processing Indicator -0.029*** -0.060*** -0.023*** -0.054***
(-4.78) (-10.17) (-3.59) (-8.86)
Firm-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,458 41,957 64,915 37,358
Note: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signifi-
cance at the 10(5) percent level. Here home tariffs in Columns (1)-(2) are measured by Eq. (20) whereas
those in Columns (3)-(4) are industry-level tariffs. Foreign tariffs are measured by Eq. (21). High overhead
indicator in Columns (1)-(4) equals one if firm’s log of overhead expenses is higher than top 25th quantile
of log of overhead expenses and zero otherwise. Analogously, low overhead indicator in Columns (1)-(4)
equals one if firm’s log of overhead expenses is lower than bottom 25th quantile of log of overhead expenses
and zero otherwise. Pure domestic firms and pure exporters are dropped from all estimates.
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Table 6: Impact of Foreign Tariffs on Scope by Per-Capita Overhead
Expenses
Measure of Home Tariffs Firm-Level Tariffs Industry-Level Tariffs
Regressand: Export Product Scope (1) (2) (3) (4)
Home Tariffs 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(29.08) (26.24) (16.49) (14.55)
Foreign Tariffs 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.003***
(13.99) (7.63) (13.83) (7.13)
Foreign Tariffs×High Overhead Indicator 0.441*** 0.265*** 0.432*** 0.298***
(7.48) (3.98) (6.80) (4.26)
Foreign Tariffs×Low Overhead Indicator -0.352*** -0.281*** -0.345*** -0.251***
(-5.70) (-4.02) (-5.39) (-3.55)
Firm Input Tariffs 0.003*** 0.003***
(3.42) (3.84)
Log Firm TFP (TFP2) 0.032*** 0.018 0.027** 0.012
(2.75) (1.35) (2.26) (0.91)
Log Weighted GDP of Importers 0.132*** 0.121*** 0.134*** 0.122***
(82.34) (64.06) (80.90) (63.39)
Foreign Indicator 0.105*** -0.031** 0.102*** -0.035**
(10.10) (-2.24) (9.39) (-2.46)
SOE Indicator 0.047* 0.048 0.020 0.011
(1.68) (1.39) (0.69) (0.31)
Processing Indicator -0.026*** -0.057*** -0.021*** -0.052***
(-4.60) (-10.18) (-3.50) (-8.98)
Firm-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 72,458 41,957 64,915 37,358
Note: Robust t-values corrected for clustering at the firm level in parentheses. *(**) indicates signifi-
cance at the 10(5) percent level. Here home tariffs in Columns (1)-(2) are measured by Eq. (20) whereas
those in Columns (3)-(4) are industry-level tariffs. Foreign tariffs are measured by Eq. (21). High over-
head indicator in Columns (1)-(4) equals one if firm’s per-capita overhead expenses is higher than top
25th quantile of per-capita overhead expenses and zero otherwise. Analogously, low overhead indicator in
Columns (1)-(4) equals one if firm’s per-capita overhead expenses is lower than bottom 25th quantile of
per-capita overhead expenses and zero otherwise. Pure domestic firms and pure exporters are dropped
from all estimates.
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Figure 1: Chinese Trading Firms’ Export Scope
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: The Proof
Proof of ds˜dt =
de˜
dt > 0.
If e = s, the firm’s total profit function is
π(s) =
 s
0
πH(ci)di+
 s
0
πF (ci)di− ks.
The first order condition is
π′(s) =
1
4b
(A−m− c− θs)2 + 1
4b
(A∗ −m− ct∗ − θt∗s)2 − k = 0.
We denote πH(s) =
1
4b (A−m− c− θs)2, πF (s) = 14b (A∗ −m− ct∗ − θt∗s)2, πT (s) =
πH(s) + πF (s), and draw all πT (s), πH(s) and πF (s) along with k in Figure 1. The
equilibrium s˜ is determined by the intersection between πT (s) and k. Should the optimal
scope be determined by πH(s) = k, it would be s˜
′. We have shown in the text that ds˜
′
dt > 0.
That is, when there is a cut in Chinese tariff, s˜′ decreases, which implies that the curve
πH(s) shifts downwards. However, the domestic tariff cut does not affect the curve πF (s).
Hence, the total profit curve πT (s) shifts downwards as well. As a result, s˜ decreases, that
is, ds˜dt > 0.
7.2 Appendix B: Matching Transaction-Level Trade Data and Firm-
Level Production Data
To investigate the impact of firm-specific tariffs on exporter scope, we need to match the
three data sets together: transaction-level trade data, firm-level production data, and
harmonized system 6-digit level tariffs data.
7.2.1 Transaction-Level Trade Data Set
The extremely disaggregated transaction-level monthly trade data during 2000-2006 are
obtained from China’s General Administration of Custom. Each transaction is described
at the HS 8-digit level. The number of monthly observations increases from around 78
thousand in January 2000 to more than 230 thousand in December 2006. As shown in
Column (1) of Table A1, the annual number of observations is more than 10 million in
2000 to 16 million in 2006, ending with a huge number of observations, 118,333,831, in
total for seven years. Column (2) of Table A1 exhibits that there are 286,819 firms that
ever engage in international trade during this period.
For each transaction, the data set compiles three types of information: (1) 5 variables
on basic trade information. This includes value (measured at US current dollar), trade
status (export or import), quantity, trade unit, value per unit (i.e., value divided by
quantity). (2) There are 6 variables on trade mode and pattern. These include country of
destination for exports, country of origin for imports, routing (i.e., whether the product is
shipped through an intermediate country/regime), customs regime (e.g., processing trade
or ordinary trade), trade mode (i.e., by sea, by truck, by air, or by post), customs port
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Figure 1: Adjustment to Tariff Cuts
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(i.e., where the product departs or arrives). (3) More importantly, the data set also reports
firm’s information associated with the transaction. In particular, it includes 7 variables
such as firm’s name, identification number set by the customs, city in China where the
firm is located, telephone, zip code, name of the manager/CEO, ownership type of firm
(e.g., foreign affiliate, private, or state-own-enterprises).
7.2.2 Firm-Level Production Data Set
The sample used in this paper comes from a rich firm-level panel dataset which covers
around 230,000 manufacturing firms per year for the years 2000-2006. The number of firms
doubled from 162,885 in 2000 to 301,961 in 2006. The data are collected and maintained by
China’s National Bureau of Statistics in an annual survey of manufacturing enterprises. It
contains entire information of three accounting sheets (i.e., Balance Sheet, Loss & Benefit
Sheet, and Cash Flow Sheet). On average, the annual entire value of industrial production
covered in such a data set accounts for around 95% of China’s total industrial production
by year. Indeed, aggregated data on the industrial sector in the annual China’s Statistical
Yearbook by the Natural Bureau of Statistics (NBS) are compiled from this dataset. The
dataset includes more than 100 financial variables listed in the main accounting sheets of
all these firms. Briefly, it covers two types of manufacturing firms: (1) all SOEs; (2) non-
SOEs whose annual sales are more than five million RMB. The number of firms increased
from more than 160 thousand in 2000 to 301 thousand in 2006. As shown in Column (3)
of Table A1, the number of firms that ever occurred in the dataset during 2000-2006 is
615,951 in total.
However, the raw production data set is still quite noisy given that many unqualified
firms are included, largely because of mis-reporting by some firms. For example, infor-
mation on some family-based firms, which usually have no formal accounting system in
place, is based on a unit of one RMB, whereas the official requirement is a unit of 1000
RMB. We hence filter the raw production data as introduced in the text. Accordingly, the
total number of firms covered in the data set is reduced to 438,165, around 1/3 of firms
are dropped from the sample after such a filter process. As shown in Column (4) of Table
A1, such a filter ratio is even higher in the initial years: around 1/2 of firms are dropped
in 2000.
7.2.3 Matching Method
Although these two data sets have rich information on production and trade, it is chal-
lenging to match them together. Both data sets contain a variable of firm’s identification
number. But their coding systems are completely different and share no any common
characteristics. For example, the lengths of the firm’s ID variable in transaction-level data
set are 10 digits whereas those in firm-levels only have 9 digits. China’s customs admin-
istration just constructs a complete coding system different from the one adopted by the
National Bureau of Statistics.
To address this challenge, we use two ways to match transaction-level trade data and
firm-level production data. First, we match two data sets by firm’s name and year. That
is, if a firm has an exact Chinese name in both data sets in a particular year, they should
be an identical firm. The year variable is necessary to use for an auxiliary identification
variable since some firms could change their name in different years and new comers could
possible take their original name. As a result, the number of matching firm is 83,679 in
total by using the raw production data set, and reduced to 69,623 in total by using the
more accurate filtered production data set.
Equally importantly, we then use another matching technique to serve as a supplement.
Here we rely on two other common variables to identify firms, namely, zip code and
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the last seven digits of a firm’s phone number. The rationale is that firms should have
different and unique phone numbers within a postal district. Although this method seems
straightforward, subtle technical and practical difficulties still remain. For example, the
phone numbers in the product-level trade data include both area phone codes and a
hyphen, whereas those in the firm-level production data do not. Therefore, we use the last
seven digits of the phone number to serve a proxy for firm identification for two reasons:
(1) during 2000—2006, some large Chinese cities changed their phone number digits from
seven to eight, which usually added one more digit at the start of the number. Therefore,
sticking to the last seven digits of the number would not confuse the firm’s identification;
and (2) in the original data set, phone number is defined as a string of characters with
the phone zip code. However, it is inappropriate to de-string such characters to numerals
since a hyphen bar is used to connect the zip code and phone number. Using the last
seven-digit substring solves this problem neatly.
A firm could miss its name information in either trade or production data set. Similarly,
a firm could lose information on phone and/or zip code. To secure that our matched data
set can cover common firms as many as possible, we then include the observations in
the matched data set if a firm occurred in either the name-adopted matched data set or
the phone-and-post-adopted matched data set. As a result, the number of matched firms
increases to 90,558 when the raw production data set is used, as shown in Column (7) of
Table A1. By way of comparison, such a matching performance is in the same magnitude
to (or even better than) other similar studies. For example, Ge et.al. (2011) used the
same data sets and similar matching techniques but ends up with 86,336 matched firms
in total. Finally, if we adopt the more rigorous filtered production data to merge with
firm data, the matched data set ends up with 76,823 firms in total, as shown in the last
column of Table A1.
7.3 Appendix C: Measuring Ex-ante TFP (TFP2)
This section draws heavily from Feenstra et al. (2013). We extend the Olley—Pakes
approach is extended by adding the firm’s export decision and a WTO indicator as two
extra arguments of the investment function Vit = g1(xit, lnKit, EXit, PEit,WTOt) where
EXit (PEit) is the export (processing export) indicator to measure whether firm i exports
(engages in processing exports) in year t, and WTOt is an indicator that equals one if the
WTO agreement has occurred after 2001 and zero before that. Therefore, inverting the
investment function with respect to its first argument we obtain:22
xit = g
−1
1 (Vit, lnKit, EXit, PEit,WTOt). (26)
Given the gross production function
lnYit = αk lnKit + αl lnLit + αm lnMit + xit + εit (27)
and defining the function g2(·) as αk lnKjt + g−11 (Vit, lnKit, EXit, PEit,WTOt), the esti-
mation of the labor (materials) coefficients αl(αm) are obtained as:
lnYit = αl lnLit + αm lnMit + g2(Vit, lnKit, EXit, PEit,WTOt) + εit. (28)
The next step is to obtain an unbiased estimated coefficient of αk. Olley-Pakes use the
following specification:
lnYit− αˆl lnLit− αˆm lnMit = αk lnKit+E(xit|xit−1, prit) + [xit−E(xit|xit−1, prit)] + εit,
(29)
22Olley and Pakes (1996) show that the investment demand function is monotonically increasing in the
productivity shock xjt, by making some mild assumptions about the firm’s production technology.
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where the estimated values of the labor coefficient and materials coefficient are used on
the left. The expectation of productivity appearing in (29) is modeled as a forth-order
polynomial function of lagged productivity, which can be obtained as (g2i,t−1−αk lnKi,t−1),
and also the predicted probability of the firm’s survival into the year t, prit, based on year
t − 1 information. The predicted probability is obtained from Probit estimation.23 The
term [xit − E(xit|xit−1, prit)] is the productivity shock for surviving firms, but does not
affect the investment or exit choice so it is treated as an error.
We estimate TFP1 and TFP2 using our matched firms. Given that the measure of TFP
requires real terms of firm’s inputs (labor and capital) and output, we adopt different price
deflators for inputs and outputs from Brandt et al. (2012) in which the output deflators
are constructed using "reference price" information from China’s Statistical Yearbooks
whereas input deflators are constructed based on output deflators and China’s national
input-output table (2002). Secondly, we take China’s WTO accession in 2001 into account
since such a positive demand shock would push Chinese firms to expand their economic
scales, which in turn can exaggerate the simultaneous bias of their measured TFP. Thirdly,
it is essential to construct the real investment variable when using the Olley-Pakes (1996)
approach. As usual, we adopt the perpetual inventory method to investigate the law
of motion for real capital and real investment. Different from assigning an arbitrary
number for the depreciation ratio, we use the exact firm’s real depreciation provided by
the Chinese firm-level data set. Finally, we also consider firm’s processing behavior in
the TFP realization by constructing a processing export indicator (one denotes processing
export and zero otherwise). The idea is that processing firms may use different technology
than non-processing firms (Feenstra and Hanson, 2005).
23Note that here the non-linear least squares approach is adopted to estimate (29) since it requires the
estimated coefficients of the log-capital in the first and second term to be identical (Pavcnik, 2002).
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Table A1: Matched Statistics—Number of Firms
Year Trade Data Production Data Matched Data
# of Transactions Firms Raw Filtered w/ Raw w/ Filtered w/ Raw w/ Filtered
Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2000 10,586,696 80,232 162,883 83,628 18,580 12,842 21,665 15,748
2001 12,667,685 87,404 169,031 100,100 21,583 15,645 25,282 19,091
2002 14,032,675 95,579 181,557 110,530 24,696 18,140 29,144 22,291
2003 18,069,404 113,147 196,222 129,508 28,898 21,837 34,386 26,930
2004 21,402,355 134,895 277,004 199,927 44,338 35,007 50,798 40,711
2005 24,889,639 136,604 271,835 198,302 44,387 34,958 50,426 40,387
2006 16,685,377 197,806 301,960 224,854 53,748 42,833 59,133 47,591
All Year 118,333,831 286819 615,951 438,165 83,679 69,623 90,558 76,946
Notes: Column (1) reports number of observations of HS eight-digit monthly transaction-level trade
data from China’s General Administration of Customs by year. Column (2) reports number of firms
covered in the transaction-level trade data by year. Column (3) reports number of firms covered in the
firm-level production dataset compiled by China’s National Bureau of Statistics without any filter and
cleaning. By contrast, Column (4) presents number of firms covered in the firm-level production dataset
with careful filter according to the requirement of GAAP. Accordingly, Column (5) reports number of
matched firms using exactly identical company’s names in both trade dataset and raw production dataset.
By contrast, Column (6) reports number of matched firms using exactly identical company’s names in
both trade dataset and filtered production dataset. Finally, Column (7) reports number of matched
firms using exactly identical company’s names and exactly identical zip code and phone numbers in both
trade dataset and raw production dataset. By contrast, Column (8) reports number of matched firms
using exactly identical company’s names and exactly identical zip code and phone numbers in both trade
dataset and filtered production dataset.
44
Appendix Table A2: Total Factor Productivity of Chinese Firms
Adjusted Chinese Industrial Classfications Labor Capital Materials TFP1 TFP2
Processing of Foods (13) 0.077 0.060 0.814 1.191 1.231
Manufacturing of Foods (14) 0.055 0.071 0.857 0.799 0.838
Manufacture of Beverages (15) 0.094 0.113 0.799 0.817 0.830
Manufacture of Tobacco (16) 0.020 0.270 0.783 0.287 0.185
Manufacture of Textile (17) 0.066 0.044 0.868 0.802 0.857
Manufacture of Apparel, Footwear & Caps (18) 0.110 0.039 0.798 1.344 1.403
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, & Feather (19) 0.084 0.041 0.857 0.872 0.902
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood,
Bamboo, Rattan, Palm & Straw Products (20)
0.099 0.071 0.841 0.686 0.717
Manufacture of Furniture (21) 0.103 0.055 0.814 1.113 1.124
Manufacture of Paper & Paper Products (22) 0.063 0.053 0.867 0.781 0.792
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media (23) 0.065 0.068 0.815 1.199 1.290
Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education
& Sport Activities (24)
0.091 0.039 0.823 1.181 1.219
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, &Fuel (25) 0.014 0.069 0.865 0.663 0.642
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials (26) 0.063 0.058 0.820 1.187 1.218
Manufacture of Medicines (27) 0.062 0.064 0.790 1.555 1.643
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers (28) 0.040 0.060 0.889 0.517 0.584
Manufacture of Rubber (29) 0.087 0.081 0.769 1.404 1.469
Manufacture of Plastics (30) 0.069 0.046 0.836 1.094 1.155
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral goods (31) 0.046 0.059 0.844 1.054 1.129
Smelting & Pressing of Ferrous Metals (32) 0.061 0.029 0.891 0.682 0.766
Smelting & Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals (33) 0.080 0.079 0.850 0.451 0.497
Manufacture of Metal Products (34) 0.062 0.037 0.841 1.150 1.147
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery (35) 0.061 0.055 0.837 1.086 1.176
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery (36) 0.053 0.049 0.841 1.152 1.191
Manufacture of Transport Equipment (37) 0.063 0.045 0.835 1.290 1.394
Electrical Machinery & Equipment (39) 0.077 0.066 0.836 0.900 0.913
Computers & Other Electronic Equipment (40) 0.109 0.075 0.806 1.175 1.243
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments & Ma-
chinery for Cultural Activity & Office Work (41)
0.049 0.054 0.806 1.639 1.703
Manufacture of Artwork (42) 0.091 0.039 0.857 0.834 0.839
Notes: We do not report standard errors for each coefficient to save space though available upon
request. The logarithm of firm productivity for Chinese firms (TFP1 and TFP2) is estimated by industry
by the augmented Olley-Pakes approach introduced in the text. Coefficients of labor, capital, and materials
are calculated at the sectoral average whereas TFP1 and TFP2 is measured at firm-level using firm-level
output, capital, labor, and materials,respectively.
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